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The Relationship Between Individual Differences in Rumination,
Distractibility, and Depression
David Y. Suh and Deanna M. Barch
Washington University in St. Louis
According to the response styles theory, rumination and distraction are two dfferent ways to respond to a negative
stimulus. Previous studies on the relationship between rumination and distraction and their effect on depression
have focused mainly on the active use of these response styles. In the present study, we examined how the natural
tendency to be distractible was related to rumination or depression. Participants were asked to answer questionnaires
to rumination, distractibility, and depression, and to perform an attention task. Self-reported level of rumination,
depression, and distractibility all had a positive correlation with each other. However, task performance indexed by
accuracy had a negative correlation with rumination. Contrary to our predictions, the results suggested that higher
depression is related to more negative self-evaluation of distractibility. However, objective evidence of distractibility
was related to less rumination, which was consistent with our predictions.
Keywords: distractibility, rumination, depression, selective attention.

Introduction
Many studies have been conducted in an
attempt to explain the variability in an individual's
vulnerability to depression. The results of these
studies have generated a number of theories about
potential vulnerability factors to depression. One
such theory is the response styles theory (RST), a
cognitive explanation developed by NolenHoeksema (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, 1998), which
attempts to explain the relationship between
depression and specific types of coping methods in
response to the experience of a negative stimulus or
negative affect. According to RST, the different
styles of coping with a negative stimulus are related
to the severity of depression, as the different coping
methods are thought to influence an individual's
attention bias and his or her ability to problemsolve. RST argues that there are two main coping
strategies in response to a negative affect:
rumination and distraction. A ruminative response
to negative affect refers to a coping strategy where
the individual focuses on the negative affect (e.g.
thinking about why he or she is so depressed) and
its consequence (e.g. thinking that he or she will
never get anything done because of the depressed
mood) in order to gain more insight (NolenHoeksema, 1991). In contrast, a distractive
response to negative affect refers to a strategy where

the individual attempts to actively distract himself
or herself away from the negative affect to replace
it with a neutral or a positive affect (e.g. listening
to music or playing games when the individual feels
depressed). This use of the concept of distraction
refers to active and deliberate attempts to engage in
activities that distract one from focusing on
negative affect. However, there is little research on
how individual differences in the natural tendency
to be distractible relates to either individual
differences in coping strategies or depression. In
this study, distractibility is defined as one's natural
tendency, or trait, to be more distracted by stimuli,
internal (e.g. daydreaming) or external (e.g. aural,
visual, etc.) in everyday life. The goal of the current
study is to examine the relationships among
individual differences in cognitive and self-report
measures of distractibility, rumination and
depression.
In a large number of empirical studies, greater
self-reported use of ruminative coping styles has
been associated with higher self-reports of
depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; Wilkinson,
Croudace, & Goodyer, 2013). A meta-analysis
conducted by Olatunji, Naragon-Gainey, and
Wolitzky-Taylor (2013) confirmed that higher
self-reports of rumination are correlated with
higher self-reports of depression and that clinically
depressed patients have significantly higher self-
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reported use of rumination than non-patients.
Furthermore, higher levels of self-reported
ruminative responses have been found to correlate
with higher self-reports of depression and anxiety
in depressed adolescents and children (Donaldson,
Lam, & Mathews, 2007). Similarly, higher trait
rumination was found to correlate with more
negative attention bias (e.g. focusing more on a
negative stimulus such as discouraging words than
to a neutral or a positive stimulus) for depressed
patients (Donaldson et al., 2007). In contrast,
higher levels of distractive responses have been
found to correlate with lower self-reports of
depression (Roelofs et al., 2009; Huffzinger &
Kuehner, 2009).
The above studies are consistent with the idea
that rumination and distraction may have a causal
effect with respect to depression, but are primarily
correlational and thus do not establish causation.
However, other studies have actually tried to
identify whether there is a causal relationship
between rumination and depression. For example,
in a study by Morrow and Nolen-Hoeksema
(1990), participants were instructed to engage in
either a distracting or ruminative coping method
after a negative mood induction. Those who were
instructed to engage in ruminative coping method
reported being more depressed than they were
before the induction, and those who were
instructed to engage in a distracting coping method
reported being less depressed than they were before
the induction. Furthermore, in a longitudinal study
by Huffzinger, Reinhard, and Kuehner (2009), it
was found that higher self-reports of rumination
predicted more depressive symptoms in
nonpatients in short- and long-term (5 months and
3 years, respectively), and higher self-reports of
depression predicted higher use of rumination in
both former patients and nonpatients in shortterm. Similarly, Koval, Kuppens, Allen, and
Sheeber (2012) found that rumination was a
significant predictor of current depression severity
in adolescents. These results are complimented by
the findings of Spasojevie and Alloy (2001), which
showed that, even after controlling for current
depression, rumination acted as a mediator in
predicting the number of prospective major
depressive episode based on the risk factors (i.e.
negative coping styles, self-criticism, neediness,

and history of past depressions). Thus, these
studies provide further evidence consistent with a
causal role for rumination in contributing to the
development of more severe depression.
As described above, it is evident that
rumination correlates with higher self-reports of
depression, while distraction as an active coping
method in response to negative affect correlates
with lower self-reports of depression. In addition,
a study by Watkins, Teasdale, and Williams (2000)
showed that active distraction disrupts some
mechanisms used for rumination, namely
categorical memory recall, or the propensity to
remember repeated events (e.g. making a mistake)
in the past. In this study, the participants
completed the Autobiographical Memory Test
(AMT), which asked them to recall a personal
memory tied to six positive words (e.g. happy), six
negative words (e.g. failure), or six neutral words
(e.g. bread) at three points in the experiment —
before distraction/rumination induction, after
distraction/rumination induction, and after
decentering/control prompt task. In the
distraction/rumination induction, the participants
were asked to engage in either distraction or
rumination by thinking about prompts (e.g. "Think
about the shape of a large black umbrella" for
distraction and "Think about what your feelings
might mean" for rumination). The results indicated
that those in the rumination induction had a higher
proportion of categorical memory recalled than
those under distraction induction, consistent with
the hypothesis that distraction blocks memory
mechanisms that may contribute to rumination.
From the studies described above, it is possible
that active distraction is related to lower selfreported depression possibly because distraction
directly competes with the ability to engage in
ruminative thinking. If so, then it is possible that
individual differences in distractibility may
influence both ruminative style and depression. By
distractibility we mean an individual's natural
tendency to be more distracted by internal or
external stimuli in everyday life, which can be
indexed either by performance on cognitive tasks
(such as the Erikson flanker task, in which the
participant is asked to identify the name of a
cartoon character into one of the two given
categories while being distracted by pictures that
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show up next to the name) or by self report
measures (questionnaires such as the Mindful
Attention Awareness Scale, which contains
questions like "I find it difficult to stay focused on
what's happening in the present."). In this study,
we choose to measure two different aspects of
distractibility: mind wandering and mindfulness.
Mind wandering has been hypothesized to
represent vulnerability to being distracted (Forster
& Lavie, 2014). On the other hand, mindfulness is
thought to be the opposite of distractibility, as it is
thought to entail the capacity for avoiding
distraction (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Mrazek,
Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012). If an individual is
naturally more distractible, they may be less likely
or able to ruminate, and thus may experience less
negative affect. However, there has been no work
that explores the relationship between individual
differences in distractibility and depression from
the perspective of understanding whether those
individuals who are more distractible are less likely
to ruminate and thus less likely to experience
depression.
The goal of the current study was to test
hypotheses about the relationship between
distractibility, the use of ruminative responses to
negative affect, and regular everyday depression. It
is worth noting that, since the relationships shown
in the studies referenced above have been
established both in clinical depression and in
normative samples that cover the depression
spectrum, we can apply the same logic to look at
regular everyday depression. We hypothesized that
individuals who either self-reported higher levels of
distractibility and/or showed more distractible
performance on a cognitive task would be less likely
to report using ruminative response styles when
experiencing negative affect. Further, given the link
between rumination and depression, we also
hypothesized that individuals with higher levels of
distractibility would show lower levels of
depression, and if so, that this would be mediated
by lower levels of rumination.

Methods
Participants
Sixty-three undergraduate volunteers (Mage =
19.71, SDage = 1.25; 17 male, 46 female) from
Washington University in St. Louis were recruited
through a volunteer website maintained by the
Psychology Department. All participants met the
criteria of being at least 18 years old, not selfreporting a history of mental illness, and of not
using psychotropic medication at the time of
testing. For analyses involving the Beck Depression
Inventory and the Mindful Attention Awareness
Scale —Lapses Only, three participants' data were
excluded due to incomplete responses. Table 1
shows the demographic characteristics of the
sample group. All participants were between the
ages of 18 and 22 and were Washington University
undergraduates with at least 12 years of education.
Measures
Rumination. The Rumination Responses
Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991)
is a 22-item scale used to measure everyday
ruminative responses to the negative mood. The
scale ranges from 1 (almost never) to 4 (always),
with total scores indicating the overall likelihood of
the use of ruminative responses. It has been shown
to be a reliable and valid measure of rumination,
with the internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) of
.89 (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Roelofs,
Muris, Huibers, Peeters, & Arntz, 2006).
Depression and anxiety. Two questionnaires
were used to measure the self-reported level of
depression. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDIII; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) is a 21-item scale
widely used to measure self-reported levels of
depression, with the internal consistency
(Cronbach's alpha) of .93. The Positive and
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-X; Watson &
Clark, 1994) is a scale that measures the degree of
various feelings (e.g. anger, sadness, shyness,
serenity, joviality, etc.) one experiences in everyday
life. Its internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha)
ranges from .83 to .90 for Positive Affect and .85
to .90 for Negative Affect. The Beck Anxiety
Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer,
1988) is a 21-item scale used to measure self-
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reported levels of anxiety with internal consistency
(Cronbach's alpha) ranging from .92 to .94. This
scale was used to address potential confounding
variables, as depression is known to positively
correlate with anxiety. Thus, BAI was used to
determine whether any obtained effects were
mainly due to depression, not anxiety.
Distractibility. A number of measures were
used to assess different aspects of distractibility.
The Daydreaming Frequency Scale (DFS; Singer
& Antrobus, 1970) is a 12-item subscale of the
Imaginal Processes Inventory that measures the
self-reported level of mind wandering in everyday
life. The option ranges from A (never) to E (most
of the time), with total scores signifying the overall
likelihood to engage in daydreaming. It is shown to
have a good internal consistency (with Cronbach's
alpha of .91), good test-retest reliability, and good
concurrent validity (Giambra, 1993; Tanaka &
Huba, 1985). The Mindful Attention Awareness
Scale — Lapses Only (MAAS-LO; Carriere,
Cheyne, & Smilek, 2008) is a 12-item scale
modified from MAAS (Brown & Ryan, 2003), a
14-item scale used to measure the level of everyday
lapses of attention (e.g. "I get so focused on the goal
I want to achieve that I lose touch with what I'm
doing right now to get there."). MAAS-LO aims
to only look at attention lapses, so it eliminates two
items from MAAS related to the consequences of
attention lapses and one item related to attention
lapses while driving. The responses for each item
range from 1 (almost always) to 6 (almost never).
MAAS is shown to have good test-retest reliability
and validity with Cronbach's alpha of .92 (Brown
& Ryan, 2003). The Cognitive Failures
Questionnaires (CFQ Broadbent, Cooper,
Fitzgerald, & Parkes, 1982) is a 25-item scale used
to measure the level of everyday cognitive failures
caused by attention lapses (e.g. "Do you find you
forget why you went from one part of the house to
the other?"). The responses for each item range
from 0 (never) to 4 (very often), and the total scores
correspond to the overall forgetfulness. It is shown
reliable and valid with the Cronbach's alpha
ranging from .85 to .89 (Broadbent et al., 1982;
Tipper & Baylis, 1987).
Attention task. To measure distractibility
during cognitive performance, we used a modified
Erikson flanker task (Forster & Lavie, 2014). In

this task, the participants were presented a target,
either the name of 6 Disney characters (Mickey,
Donald, Pluto, Pooh, Piglet, Tigger) or 6
superheroes (Superman, Spiderman, Hulk,
Wolverine, Batman, Robin) for 2000 ms following
a central fixation point (500 ms) on a computer
screen. The target was presented in one of the six
positions from the central fixation point, ranging
from 2.3 degrees below to 2.3 degrees above. The
majority of the trials (90%) were presented with
just the target. 10% of the trials had an equal
chance of having a task-congruent distractor, taskincongruent distractor, or a task-irrelevant
distractor. A task-congruent distractor is a picture
from the same set as the target (e.g. Mickey if the
target is Pooh). A task-incongruent distractor is a
picture from the other set (e.g. Superman if the
target is Pooh). A task-irrelevant distractor is a
picture from neither the Disney nor the superhero
set (a picture from a 6 cartoon character set:
SpongeBob SquarePants, Hello Kitty, Cartman
from the South Park cartoon, Bart Simpson, an
Angry Bird, and Pikachu). These distractors were
presented either to the left or right to the target.
Participants were asked to push buttons to indicate
whether the target was a superhero name or a
Disney character name as fast and as accurately as
possible. Participants completed 12 blocks of 60
trials, and the first three trials of each block were
considered warm-up trials and were excluded from
analysis. Participants were asked to verbally
identify all of the cartoon characters involved in
this task prior to the start of the task to make sure
they were already familiar with all the characters.
As a measure of distraction, we focused on the
difference between the no-distractor condition and
the task-incongruent condition by calculating the
differences in reaction time and accuracy between
the two conditions.
Procedure
First, participants completed an informed
consent form to make sure they knew the general
procedure and risk of participating in the study.
Then, they completed the modified Eriksen flanker
task according to the steps described above. After
the task, they completed the battery of
questionnaires about depression, rumination, and
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distractibility listed above. In the end, they were
debriefed with an explanation of the goal of the
study.
Data Analysis
To analyze the relationships among
rumination, depression, and distractibility, we
computed Pearson Product-Moment correlation
among all the questionnaires using SPSS 21.
Furthermore, we computed Pearson ProductMoment correlation and performed mediation
analyses for all questionnaires and the reaction time
differences and the accuracy differences using
SPSS 21 to examine the relationship between task
performance and self-reported level of
distractibility, rumination, and depression.

Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the
questionnaires used in this study.
Rumination and Depression
The Pearson Product-Moment correlation
coefficients among RRS, BDI-II, Sadness subscale
of PANAS-X, BAI, CFQ, DFS, and MAAS-LO
are shown in Table 3. As expected, we were able to
replicate the well-documented relationship
between rumination and depression. RRS, which
measures the self-reported level of rumination, had
a moderate positive correlation with BDI-II.
Similarly, RRS also had a moderate positive
correlation with the Sadness subscale of PANASX.
Self-Reported Distractibility, Rumination and
Depression
We hypothesized that self-reported
distractibility and rumination would be negatively
correlated. However, as shown in Table 3, both
CFQ and DFS were moderately positively
correlated with the RRS. Furthermore, MAASLO had a strong positive correlation with RRS.
Similarly, we had also hypothesized that selfreported distractibility and depression would be
negatively correlated. However, as shown in Table
BDI-II was moderately positively correlated
with CFQ and MAAS-LO. Furthermore, the

Sadness subscale of PANAS-X had a moderate
positive correlation with DFS.
Correlation between Task Performance and
Rumination
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for the
attention task, including the reaction time
differences and the accuracy differences between
the no-distractor condition and the incongruent
distractor condition. The one-way repeated
measures ANOVAs for accuracy and reaction time
(RT) comparing the conditions (no distractor,
congruent distractor, neutral distractor, and
incongruent distractor), replicated the result of the
previous study. There was a significant main effect
of condition for reaction time, F(3,63) = 136.29, p
< .001. Post-hoc contrasts indicated that the
incongruent and neutral conditions did not differ
significantly in RT, but both were significantly
slower than the no-distraction condition (p < .05).
Further, the no-distraction condition was faster
than the congruent condition (p < .05). There was
also a significant main effect for accuracy, F(3,63)
= 58.60,p < .001. Post-hoc contrasts indicated that
all conditions were significantly different (ps <
.001). Performance was best in the congruent
condition, followed by the no-distractor condition,
followed by the neutral condition, with the worse
performance in the incongruent condition.
We had hypothesized that rumination and
distractibility (measured by the accuracy and
reaction time difference between the taskirrelevant and no-distraction condition) would be
negatively correlated, such that those individuals
who were more distractible would show less
rumination. As shown in Table 5, RRS was not
correlated with the RT measure of distractibility,
but was negatively correlated with the accuracy
measure of distractibility. In other words, greater
distractibility was associated with less rumination.
However, the other self-report measures for
depression and distractibility were not correlated
with the accuracy or the reaction time of the
attention task.
Mediation Analysis
We had originally hypothesized that
greater distractibility would be associated with
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lower rumination and that this in turn would
be associated with less depression. This
hypothesis suggests that rumination should
relationship
between
any
mediate
distractibility and depression. For our object
measure of distractibility, indexed by attention
task performance, we did see the predicted
relationship to rumination, but we did not see
any relationship between objective
distractibility and depression. Thus, the
conditions for testing a mediator model for
objective distractibility were not met. Further,
we did not find the predicted direction of
self-reported
between
relationships
distractibility and either rumination or
depression. In contrast to our hypotheses, we
found positive relationships between all of our
self-report measures of distractibility and
rumination, and positive relationship between
CFQ and MAAS-LO measures and
depression. One potential hypothesis, as
discussed in more detail below, is that
depression contributes to greater negative selfevaluations, and if so, then depression could be
mediating the relationship between
rumination and self-reported distractibility.
To test this hypothesis for CFQ and
MAAS-LO measures (which were correlated
with both depression and rumination), we used
the PROCESS model developed by Preacher
and Hayes (Hayes, 2013). For CFQ.. the
PROCESS analyses indicated that depression
was a significant mediator of the relationship
between rumination and CFQ(/3 = .1259, 95%
CI: .0364, .2767), although this mediation was
only partial, as the direct effect of rumination
to CFQwas still significant (/3 = .2813, t =
2.23, p = .0294). However, depression did not
mediate the relationship between rumination
and either DFS (/3 = .0198, 95% CI: -.2097,
.1231), or MAAS-LO (/3 = .0363, 95% CI: .0048, .1280).

Discussion
In this study, we aimed to explore the
relationship among individual differences in
distractibility, rumination, and depression.
that
we
hypothesized
Specifically,
distractibility indexed by self-report and the
task performance on a cognitive task would be
negatively correlated with rumination, and that
given the positive correlation between
rumination and depression found in various
studies, distractibility would in turn be
negatively correlated with depression.
However, instead we found seemingly
contradicting relationships. We were able to
replicate the well-documented positive
correlation between rumination and
Furthermore,
distractibility
depression.
measured by the accuracy on the selective
attention task had a negative correlation with
the self-reported level of rumination, which
was consistent with our hypothesis. However,
contrary to our predictions, we found that
distractibility measured by self-report was
associated with greater rumination and
depression, which was not consistent with our
hypotheses.
Opposite to our expectations, a higher selfreported level of distractibility was correlated
with a higher self-reported level of rumination
and depression. This result could be seen as
contradictory to the studies discussed in the
introduction that found a negative relationship
between the use of distraction and depression.
As described in the introduction, prior work
suggests that distractive responses to negative
stimuli could work against depression and
rumination (Huffzinger & Kuehner, 2009;
Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Roelofs
et al., 2009). However, our findings suggest
that self-reported distractibility was positively
associated with both rumination and
depression.
Although finding that higher depression
was associated with higher self-reported
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distractibility is contradicting to our
hypothesis, there is evidence suggesting that
depression in fact may affect cognitive
functions such as attention and therefore may
be associated with worse distractibility. A
meta-analysis by Snyder (2013) found that
depressed patients had executive function
impairments compared to healthy controls,
with such impaired executive functions
including attentional performance. Similarly, a
meta-analysis by Rock, Roiser, Riedel, and
Blackwell (2014) showed that clinically
depressed patients had moderate cognitive
deficits in executive function, memory, and
attention compared to the control group, and
that even after remission, the patients still had
moderate cognitive deficits in executive
function and attention. Further, Hasselbalch,
Knorr, and Kessing (2011) showed that
clinically depressed patients in remission
showed a decrease in sustained and selective
attention, memory, and executive function.
Therefore, these meta-analyses suggest that
more severe depression may in fact be related
to higher distractibility or poorer attention. In
the current study, we did not find that
depression related to task performance, though
it was significantly related to self-reported
cognitive distractibility. As noted previously,
however, this was a non-clinical sample and a
higher level of depression severity may be
needed before objective cognitive impairments
are found.
In contrast, it is worth noting that, unlike
self-reported distractibility, distractibility
indexed by task performance had a modest
relationship with rumination in the predicted
direction, at least for accuracy. Since the
accuracy difference was calculated by
subtracting the accuracy in the no distractor
condition by the accuracy in the incongruent
distractor condition, a negative correlation
reveals that, the lower the self-reported level of
rumination, the greater the effect of the
incongruent distractor condition. In other

words, those who are more distracted on the
attention task had a lower self-reported level of
rumination. This result is consistent with our
hypothesis, though as noted above, we did not
find that performance on the attention task
was also related to lower depression.
As described above, we found strong
positive relationships between depression and
self-reports of distractibility, but no
relationship between depression and
distractibility measured by attention task
performance. Further, we found no
self-reported
relationships
between
distractibility and distractibility measured by
attention task performance. One hypothesis to
explain this discrepancy between self-reports
of distractibility and attention task
performance is that it may be evidence of
negative bias among depressed people, who
may be more likely to negatively evaluate their
personal attributes, including distractibility.
Such a result was also found in a study by
Zuroff, Colussy, and Wielgus (1983). More
specifically, we found that individuals who
reported higher depression also reported that
they had worse attention and were more
distractible. However, their objective task
performance did not provide any evidence that
they actually were more distractible. Thus,
their higher self-reported distractibility may
reflect a negative self-evaluation bias associated
with depression. This hypothesis is consistent
with the results of our mediation analysis of the
self-report measures in this study, as we found
that depression was a significant partial
mediator of the relationship between
rumination and distractibility indexed by
CFQ
It is worth noting the limitations of the
study. The most significant limitation is the
sample group composition. Only Washington
University undergraduates who signed up via
the Psychology Subject Pool were included in
the study, and the sample had a high gender
skew towards female (73% of the sample).
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Thus, our results may not be representative of
the general population and it is possible that
different results might be found in a more
diverse population or in a more severely
depressed population. Furthermore, the
majority of the relationships that were that
were statistically significant were self-report
measures, which may not be the most accurate
depiction of the participant's behavior in real
life due to various biases. For example, the
answers may be distorted by the social
desirability bias, which could drive an
individual exaggerate their answers to fit with
what is desirable in society (e.g. saying they are
nicer than they actually are). Moreover, the
participant's answer may be affected by his or
her mood at the time (e.g. scoring higher on a
happiness scale because he or she just watched
something funny). In order to overcome this
limitation, in future work it would be
informative to gather data from the perspective
of the participant's friends or family members
in order to obtain a more complete depiction
of the participant.
In conclusion, this study showed that
individual differences in self-reported
distractibility, unlike active distraction as a
coping method, were not associated with
reduced rumination or depression. instead we
found that greater self-reported distractibility
was associated with higher rumination and
depression. This finding is more consistent
with the literature suggesting that depression
may be associated with impaired cognitive
function. However, further research is needed
to explore the potentially causal relationships
between depression and distractibility, as the
meta-analyses above demonstrate the
relationship between depression and cognitive
impairment, but do not establish the causal
pathways. We did find that greater
distractibility on an attention task was
associated with lower rumination, but was not
further associated with depression. This
discrepancy between the attention task

performance and the self-reported level of
distractibility needs to be further explored to
test whether it is due to the negative bias in
depressed people or it is due to some other
factor.
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Appendix
Table 1
Demo ra hic characteristics of the sam le • rou
Age (M, SD)
Ethnicity (N, %)
Asian
Black or African American
White
More than one race
Other
Educatio 1 in years (M, SD)

Male (N=17, 27%)

Female (N=46, 73%)

19.65, 0.93

19,74, 1.36

4, 23.5%
1, 5.9%
11, 64.7%
0, 0%
1, 5.9%
13.24, 1.25

15, 32.6%
3, 6.5%
26, 56.5%
2, 4.3%
0, 0%
13.93, 1.55
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics for the questionnaire scores
BAI

CFQ

BDI-II

DFS

RRS

MAAS-LO Sadness subscale
(PANAS-X)

44.794
35.967
10.635
39.619
27.238
9.267
10.857
13.02
9.01
3.86
8.14
9.17
7.52
12.97
Note. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory=II; PANAS-X = Sadness subscale of Positive and Negative Affect Scale; BAI = Beck Anxiety
Inventory; CFQ= Cognitive Failures Questionnaire; DFS = Daydreaming Frequency Scale; MAAS-LO = Mindful Attention Awareness Scale Lapses Only.
M

SD

Table 3
Pearson Product-Moment correlations among self-reported distractibility, rumination, depression and
anxiety
Ruminative Responses Scale
Beck Depression Inventory
Sadness subscale (PANAS-X)
Beck Anxiety Inventory
Cognitive Failures Questionnaire
Daydreaming Frequency Scale

BDI-II

PANAS-X

BAI

CFQ

DFS

MAAS-LO

.36-

.45.50-

.24
.50.20

.36.44.23
.30*

.28*
.20
.38.09
.35-

.52"
.31*
.25
.27*
.55"
.48-

** p < .01, 2-tailed.
*p< .05, 2-tailed.
Note. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory - II; PANAS-X = Sadness subscale of Positive and Negative Affect Scale; BAI =
Beck Anxiety Inventory; CFQ= Cognitive Failures Questionnaire; DFS = Daydreaming Frequency Scale; MAAS-LO = Mindful
Attention Awareness Scale - Lapses Only.

Table 4
Descriptive statistics for the task data
Incongruent Distractor

Irrelevant Distractor

Congruent Distractor

No Distractor

RT (ms)

ACC

RT (ms)

ACC

RT (ms)

ACC

RT (ms)

ACC

M

715.992

0.831

706.787

0.897

621.122

0.939

611.626

0.922

SD

108.40

0.09

102.69

0.07

82.03

0.05

71.63

0.05

Note. RT = Reaction time (in ms); ACC = Accuracy.

Table 5
Pearson Product-Moment correlations among self-reported distractibility, rumination, depression,
anxiety and attention task data
(No distractor) - (Incongruent)
Reaction time

Accuracy

.07
.21
.06
-.02
-.05
-.02
-.03

-.25*
.01
-.08
.02
.04
-.02
-.18

Ruminative Responses Scale
Beck Depression Inventory
Sadness Subscale (PANAS-X)
Beck Anxiety Inventory
Cognitive Failures Questionnaire
Daydreaming Frequency Scale
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale - Lapses Only
*p< .05,

2-tailed.
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